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1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the role of policy on the intertemporal government budget in a growing open 
economy including nom inal assets. Specifically, we evaluate fiscal and monetary policies in 
terms of the public ’s intertemporal tax liability, measured by the presen t value of future lum p-
sum taxes scaled by th e domestic capital stock. In a sm all open economy m odel, the constraint  
for the valuation of private and public financial assets is in te rms of the exogenous foreign price  
level. Bianconi and Fisher (2005) show that this limits, under purchasing power parity, the scope 
of the government to influence the real value of financial assets using fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments.1 We take a step further by considering budge t policies in the presence of an upward 
sloping supply of debt. This introduces a prem ium on the interes t service paid to d omestic and 
foreign creditors and makes the interest rate in a sm all open econom y vary with the level of  
foreign indebtedness. A s in the open econom y growth fram ework of Turnovsky (1997a), this 
provides an endogenous channel of interest movements, similar to the case of a closed econom y. 
Hence, even though the private an d public assets are denominated in terms of the foreign price 
level, the interest “prem ium" introduces tr ansitional dynam ics and convergence towards the 
balanced growth path wh ere the growth rates of domestic capital and consum ption are equated 
through an adjustment of the country’s net foreign asset position.2 
Our paper relates to sev eral recent strands in the literature in this area. Our model is one 
in which domestic nominal assets are denom inated in terms of the foreign good, and som etimes 
this is referred to as “dolla rization”, see, for exam ple, the work of Calvo (2001), Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001). In addition, our analysis of the governm ent budget constraint and balanced 
growth relates to a literature on Laffer-style e ffects of fiscal policy, e.g. Laffer (1976), Slem rod 
(1994), Ireland (1994), Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Bianconi (1999), Novales and Ruiz (2002), 
Bianconi and Fisher (2005) and Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006). 
In this paper, we extend the results of Bian coni and Fisher (2005) to a framework where 
the net foreign asset pos ition adjusts endogenously to take the economy to its  balanced growth  
path. This adds a new  channel for the possib ility of dynam ic scoring. In particular, the 
transitional dynamics of a change in the capital incom e tax can contribute significantly to the 
possibility of dynamic scoring taking place.  
                                                     
1 Their result hinges on the fact that the real stock of public debt is insulated from domestic price level shifts. 
 
2 Chen et al (2008) examines a related problem from the perspective of Taylor rules for interest rates. 
2 
 
A third recent strand of the literature is the interest burden in indebted economies and the 
possibility of erosion of governm ent debts. This is the focus of the work of Engen and Hubbard 
(2004), Aizenm an and Marion (2009), and Hall a nd Sargent (2010). In our paper, assets are 
denominated in foreign currency and dom estic price level changes do not affect the value of the  
debt; however it does have an effect on future tax liabilities through the trad itional inflation tax  
channel. Finally, our paper provides insigh t into the twin deficit phenom enon, a question 
addressed by Feldstein (1987), Chinn (2005) and Bartolini and Lahiri (2006), among others.  
One goal of our m odel is to pr ovide a direct link between th e “twin” def icits with in a 
framework of intertem poral solvency and endoge nous growth. In this c ontext, one of the key 
results is that the economy’s long-run tax liabil ity depends not only the prim ary de ficit net of 
inflation tax revenues, but als o—in sharp contrast to Bianconi  and Fisher (2005)—on the long-
run accum ulation of national deb t in term s of the capital stock,  as well as  on the speed o f 
adjustment to the long-run balanced  growth path. The latter is a c onsequence of the fact that the 
economy borrows (and lends) subject to an upw ard-sloping interest rate relationship. Our novel 
result is that the possib ility of dynam ic scoring of a cut in capital incom e tax depends on the 
effect on national borrowing. A de crease in the cap ital tax increases the growth rate, which 
increases foreign debt; this will decrease th e long run liability because h igher growth increases 
capital tax revenues and reduces the long term  t ax liability. Hence, in our fram ework foreign 
deficits are negatively related to the long term liability of the government. This effect is enlarged 
in the case where a tax-cum -expenditure policy is  used. In addition, our num erical simulations 
show that the introduction of an upward sloped supply of debt makes the capital income tax rate 
policy less likely to balance of the intertemporal government budget constraint in the long run. In 
particular, for a large part of the param eter space, the ca pital income tax rate alone canno t 
balance the intertemporal budget.  
The paper is organized in the following. Sectio n 2 we describe our m odel, based on the 
indebted open econom y fra mework of Turnovs ky (1997a), and derive the dynam ic, growth 
equilibrium. In section 3 we calculate the pub lic sector’s intertem poral budget constraint and 
derive the expression for present value of future lump-sum taxes in terms of the economy’s fiscal 
and m onetary policy tools and long-run adjustm ent of national debt scaled by th e dom estic 
capital stock. We discuss the steady-state equilibrium in section 4 and describe the corresponding 
long-run f iscal and m onetary polic y m ultipliers, as well as the im plications of  a shif t in the 
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interest “premium". In sectio n 5 we analyze the im plications of several budget policies on the 
solvency of the public sector. In section 6 we  conduct several num erical policy simulations and 
also consider shif ts in the inte rest rate relationship. We close the paper in section 7 with brief 
concluding rem arks and with a m athematical a ppendix that underlies som e of the analytical 
results discussed in the main text. 
 
2. The Model and Growth Equilibrium 
In this section we outline the sm all open ec onomy structure, which is based on the endogenous 
growth model of Bianconi and Fisher (2005). As  indicated, a key differe nce, however, between 
this and the earlier framework is  the assumption of an upward sloping supply of debt. Under this 
specification, the econo my’s net f oreign ass et position ad justs so tha t all growth  rates a re 
equalized along the b alanced gro wth path. Moreover,  the m acroeconomic equ ilibrium is  
characterized by saddlepath dynamics. As in Bianconi and Fisher (2005), this is a one-good open 
economy fram ework in which purchasing power pa rity (PPP) holds at all tim es. Letting ݌ 
represent th e rate of  dom estic inf lation (݌ ≡ ሶܲ/ܲ, where ܲ is the domestic price level), ݌∗ the 
exogenous foreign rate of inflation ( ݌∗ ≡ ሶܲ ∗/ܲ∗, where ܲ∗ is the given world price level), and ݁ 
is the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency (݁ ≡ ܧሶ /ܧ, where ܧ in the nominal exchange 
rate), PPP corresponds to: 
                                    ݌ ൌ ݌∗ ൅ ݁																																																																															ሺ1aሻ  
We im pose, as do Bianconi and Fi sher (2005), nom inal interest rate parity, but alter it by 
incorporating a “prem ium” term th at is an increasing, convex function of the stock of the real 
national debt ݖ ≡ ܼ/ܲ∗ scaled by the domestic capital stock ݇:3 
݅ ൌ ݅∗ ൅ ݁ ൅ ݒ ቀݖ݇ቁ	,				ݒ
ᇱ ൐ 0,			ݒᇱᇱ ൐ 0,																																											ሺ1bሻ 
where ܼ is the nom inal stock of national debt, ݅ represents th e dom estic nationa l interest rate,  
while ݅∗ is the exogenous world nom inal interest rate. Substituting ሺ1aሻ into ሺ1bሻ, we obtain the  
corresponding real interest rate parity condition: 
݅ െ ݌ ൌ ݅∗ െ ݌∗ ൅ ݒ ቀݖ݇ቁ ≡ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ	,				ݎ
ᇱ ൐ 0,			ݎᇱᇱ ൐ 0.																														ሺ1cሻ 
                                                     
3 The premium function can be rationalized on the basis of a factors model, here with one factor included; 
or as a ratings function (such as Moody’s, for example) so that the lower the rating the higher the interest 
paid at the margin. 
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The economy is m odeled as a representative agent with instantaneous preferences for  
consumption ܿ  and real m oney balances ݉ ≡ ܯ/ܲ , whe re ܯ  is the nom inal stock m oney 
balances. We specify that instantaneous preferences take the simple separable logarithmic form: 
ܷሺܿ,݉ሻ ൌ log ܿ ൅ ߛ log݉ ,			ߛ ൐ 0	.																																														ሺ1dሻ 
The agent also accumulate s re al inte rnational f inancial a ssets (debt)  ܾ ൌ ܤ/ܲ∗ , where th e 
nominal stock of bonds ܤ is deflated by the foreign price leve l. The real return on international 
assets corresponds to (1c), respectively, while th e (negative) real return on dom estic m oney 
equals – ሺ݌∗ ൅ ݁ሻ.  As a producer, the agent has access to a technology that is linear homogenous 
in the domestic capital stock, ܣ݇ , which, under appropriate condition s detailed below, can 
sustain on-going growth.4 To prevent instantaneous adjustment of the domestic capital stock, we 
assume that real inves tment ܫ  incurs insta llation costs m odeled ac cording to th e standard  
quadratic specification:5 
Φሺ݅, ݇ሻ ൌ ܫ ൬1 ൅ ݄ܫ2݇൰ ,			݄ ൐ 0	.																																																		ሺ1eሻ 
In addition, we follow authors such as Rebelo  (1991), Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Bianconi 
(1999) and Bianconi and Fisher (2005) by fixing the level of employment. 
The representative agent’s problem is formulated as follows: 
නሺlog ܿ ൅
ஶ
଴
ߛ log݉ሻ݁ିఋ௧݀ݐ,			ߜ ൐ 0	,																																												ሺ2aሻ 
subject to: 
ሶ݉ ൅ ሶܾ ൅ ܫ ൬1 ൅ ݄ܫ2݇൰ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߙ݇ ൅ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ ܾ െ ܿ െ ሺ݌
∗ ൅ ݁ሻ݉ െ ܶ,																		ሺ2bሻ 
ሶ݇ ൌ ܫ,																																																																																																																																			ሺ2cሻ 
where ߬ ൌ capital (output) tax rate ( ߬	 ∈ 	 ሾ0,1ሿ), ܶ ൌ lump-sum taxes,  ߜ ൌ exogenous domestic 
rate of time preference. The agent’s maximization problem is also subject to initial conditions on 
the stocks of dom estic capital, nom inal domestic money, and real international bonds: ݇ሺ0ሻ ≡
݇଴ ൐ 0, ܯሺ0ሻ ≡ ܯ଴ ൐ 0 , ܾሺ0ሻ ≡ ܤ଴/ ଴ܲ∗ ൐ 0 . In perf orming the optim ization, the ag ent als o 
                                                     
4 Some main references are Barro (1990), Jones and Manuelli (1990), Jones et al (1993), Rebelo (1991), 
Turnovsky (1996). 
 
5 The standard reference for the Tobin’s q model of investment is Hayashi (1982). 
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takes the real interes t rate ݎሺݖ/݇ሻ as given . Standard techniques y ield the following optimality 
conditions: 
1
ܿ ൌ ߣ,																																																																									ሺ3aሻ 
1 ൅ ݄ ܫ݇ ൌ ݍ		 ⟹		
ܫ
݇ ൌ
ሶ݇
݇ ൌ
ݍ െ 1
݄ 	≡ ߶	 ⟹ 		݇ሺݐሻ ൌ ݁
׬ థሺ௦ሻௗ௦೟బ ,																						ሺ3bሻ 
ߜ െ ߣሶߣ ൌ
ߛ
ߣ݉ െ ሺ݌
∗ ൅ ݁ሻ ൌ ݎ ቀݖ݇ቁ,																																															ሺ3cሻ 
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߙ
ݍ ൅
ሺݍ െ 1ሻଶ
2݄ݍ ൅
ݍሶ
ݍ ൌ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ,																																														ሺ3dሻ 
lim௧→ஶߣܾ݁ିఋ௧ ൌ lim௧→ஶߣ݉݁ିఋ௧ ൌ lim௧→ஶݍߣ݇݁ିఋ௧ ൌ 0,																																			ሺ3eሻ 
where ߣ is the shadow value of  inter national ass ets, ݍ ≡ ݍ′/ߣ is the shadow value of dom estic 
capital in te rms of international assets, and  ߶ denotes the econom y’s balanced growth rate that 
will be de termined below. Equations ሺ3aሻ െ ሺ3eሻ  have the following straightforward 
interpretation: ሺ3aሻ states that the m arginal utility of consumption equals the shadow value of 
traded international assets; while ሺ3bሻ indicates that the m arginal cost of investm ent equals the 
shadow value (Tobin’s q) of domestic capital. Combining the optimality conditions for domestic 
money and international bonds, we derive in ሺ3cሻ the real arbitrage condition for these assets, 
which, in turn, equals the rate of return of consumption, given by ሺߜ െ ߣሶ/ߣሻ. Observe, again, that 
the real return to international assets includes the “premium" ݒሺݖ/݇ሻ that depends on the national 
debt to capital ratio ݖ/݇. The arbitrage condition for domestic capital, given by ሺ3dሻ, must equal 
that of foreign bonds. Finally, the necessa ry transversality  conditions for bonds ܾ , dom estic 
money ݉, and domestic physical capital ݇ are stated in ሺ3eሻ.6 
                                                     
6 Substituting for ሺ3bሻ and the solution for the shadow value ߣ, given by: 
ߣ ൌ ߣሺ0ሻ exp ቊߜݐ െ න ݎ ቀݖ݇ቁ݀ݏ
௧
଴
ቋ 
into the transversality condition ሺ3eሻ: 
lim௧→∞ ݍߣ݇݁ିఋ௧ ൌ 
ൌ lim௧→∞ ߣሺ0ሻሼexp ቈߜݐ െ න ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ݀ݏ
௧
଴
቉ ∙ ݍ෤ ∙ ݇଴ exp ቈන ߶ሺݏሻ݀ݏ
௧
଴
቉ ∙ ݁ିఋ௧ ൌ 
ݍ෤ ∙ ݇଴lim௧→∞ exp ቊන ቂ߶ሺݏሻ െ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁቃ
௧
଴
݀ݏቋ ൌ 0, 
which implies that the transversality condition is satisfied for q → q෤  and r → r෤ only if ϕ෩ ൏ ݎሺz/k෪ ሻ, where ~ 
refers to the balanced growth equilibrium. 
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We next turn to the dom estic public sector  and describe the rela tionships defining the 
evolution of its financial liabilities. The public sector sells debt to foreign and domestic investors, 
assumed to be perf ect substitutes for private assets traded internationally. Consequently, it bea rs 
a real rate of return equal to ݎሺݖ/݇ሻ ൌ ݅∗ െ ݌∗ ൅ ݒሺݖ/݇ሻ. In contrast, m oney balances issued by 
the public sector are held onl y by dom estic residents and erode in v alue at the r ate equa l to  
݌∗ ൅ ݁. The flow of the government budget identity then corresponds to:  
aሶ ൅ ሶ݉ ൌ ܩ ൅ ݎ ቀݖ݇ቁ ܽ െ ܶ െ ߬ߙ݇ െ ሺ݌
∗ ൅ ݁ሻ݉	,																																	ሺ4aሻ 
where ܽ ≡ ܣ/ܲ∗ is the real stock of government bonds evaluated in terms the exogenous foreign 
price level and ܩ ൌreal governm ent expenditure. The e volution of gover nment bonds is also 
subject to  an initial co ndition corresponding to ܽሺ0ሻ ൌ ܽ଴ ൌ ܣ/ܲ∗ 	൐ 0, where ܣ denotes the 
nominal stock of government bonds in terms of foreign currency. To guarantee the intertemporal 
solvency of the public sector, we im pose th e following lim iting condition on the path of 
government debt:  lim௧→ஶ ߣܽ݁ିఋ௧ ൌ 0. Along with Bianconi (1999) and Bianconi and Fisher 
(2005), we assum e that governm ent expenditure and lum p-sum taxes are set proportional to 
output. For government expenditure, this im plies that ܩሺݐሻ ൌ ݃̅ߙ݇ሺݐሻ, where ݃̅ is the fraction of 
output devoted to public expenditures; wh ile for lump-sum taxes, the  fraction തܶሺݐሻ corresponds 
to തܶሺݐሻ ൌ ܶሺݐሻ/ߙ݇ሺݐሻ . Finally, we specify that the public  sector follows a sim ple constant 
nominal money growth rule, i.e., it sets ߪ ൌ ܯሶ /ܯ, which im plies that the evolu tion of the real 
money supply equals:7 
ሶ݉ ൌ ሺߪ െ ݌ሻ݉ ൌ ሺߪ െ ݌∗ െ ݁ሻ݉.																																																ሺ4bሻ 
Using the def inition o f real na tional debt,  ݖ ≡ ܽ െ ܾ , com bining ሺ2bሻ  and ሺ4bሻ  yields the 
expression for the current account balance: 
ݖሶ ൌ ܿ ൅ ܫ ൬1 ൅ ݄ܫ2݇൰ െ ሺ1 െ ݃̅ሻߙ݇ ൅ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ ݖ,																																							ሺ5aሻ 
where we substitute  ܩሺݐሻ ൌ ݃̅ߙ݇ሺݐሻ to obtain ሺ5aሻ. Substituting for ܫ ൌ ݄ିଵሺݍ െ 1ሻ݇ in ሺ5aሻ, 
we can express the current account balance in terms of ݍ: 
ݖሶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݃̅ሻߙ݇ ൅ ܿ ൅ ሺݍ
ଶ െ 1ሻ
2݄ ൅ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ ݖ.																																									ሺ5bሻ 
                                                     
7 The constant rate of growth of money policy is not backed by any public debt, as in the contribution of 
Auernheimer (1974). 
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We next develop the o pen economy growth eq uilibrium, which we derive in term s of 
intensive variables. Specifically, we scale the variables of interest by the domestic capital stock ݇ 
and employ the following notation, respectively, fo r consumption and national debt in term s of 
the domestic capital stock: ߯ ≡ ܿ/݇ and ߰ ≡ ݖ/݇. The rates of growth of these ratios equal: 
ሶ߯
߯ ≡
ሶܿ
ܿ െ
ሶ݇
݇ ,											
ሶ߰
߰ ≡
ݖሶ
ݖ െ
ሶ݇
݇. 
	Calculating the time derivative of ሺ3aሻ and combining with ሺ3aሻ and ሺ3cሻ, we obtain: 
ܥሶ
ܥ ൌ െ
ߣሶ
ߣ ൌ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ െ ߜ.																																																														ሺ6ሻ 
Using the def initions ߯ ≡ ܿ/݇  and ߰ ≡ ݖ/݇ , we s olve for the differential equation ሶ߯  for 
consumption-capital ratio: 
ሶ߯ ൌ ൤ݎሺ߰ሻ െ ߜ െ ݍ െ 1݄ ൨ ߯.																																																						ሺ7aሻ 
Using ሺ3bሻ and ሺ6ሻ and the definitions ߯ ≡ ܿ/݇ and ߰ ≡ ݖ/݇, the differential equation ሶ߰  for the 
national debt-domestic capital ratio is also straightforward to obtain: 
ሶ߰ ൌ ߯ ൅ ሺݍ
ଶ െ 1ሻ
2݄ െ
ሺݍ െ 1ሻ
݄ െ ሺ1 െ ݃̅ሻߙ ൅ ݎሺ߰ሻ߰.																																ሺ7bሻ 
Clearly, the differential equation for Tobin’s ݍ is found directly in term s of national debt to 
capital ratio through the upward-sloping interest rate relationship: 
ݍሶ ൌ ݎሺ߰ሻݍ െ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߙ െ ሺݍ െ 1ሻ
ଶ
2݄ .																																															ሺ7cሻ 
For convenience, we collect ሺ7aሻ െ ሺ7cሻ and state the system  desc ribing the dynam ics of the  
small open economy 
ሶ߯ ൌ ൤ݎሺ߰ሻ െ ߜ െ ݍ െ 1݄ ൨ ߯, 
ሶ߰ ൌ ߯ ൅ ሺݍ
ଶ െ 1ሻ
2݄ െ
ሺݍ െ 1ሻ
݄ െ ሺ1 െ ݃̅ሻߙ ൅ ݎሺ߰ሻ߰,																																ሺ8ሻ 
ݍሶ ൌ ݎሺ߰ሻݍ െ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߙ െ ሺݍ െ 1ሻ
ଶ
2݄ . 
Employing standard m ethods, the saddlepath solu tions for the consump tion-capital, national 
debt-capital, and Tobin’s ݍ correspond to: 
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߯ െ ෤߯ ൌ ෤߯ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯
ߦଵ ቎1 ൅
ݍ෤
݄
ቂݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ቃ െ ߦଵ
቏ ∙ ൫߰ െ ෨߰൯,																										ሺ9aሻ 
ݍ െ ݍ෤ ൌ െ ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ݍ෤
ቂݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ቃ െ ߦଵ
∙ ൫߰ െ ෨߰൯,																																				ሺ9bሻ 
where  ߰ ൌ ෨߰ െ ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯݁కభ௧  is the stable s olution f or th e national debt-capital ratio, and 
ߦଵ ൏ 0 is the s table root of  the system.8 The saddlepaths are illustra ted in Figure 1 and describe 
negatively-sloped relationships. The upper panel of Figure 1 depicts the locus XX de scribing the 
stable adjustment of ߰ and ߯. It is negatively sloped, since a gr eater level of indebtedness lowers 
domestic wealth, which reduces cons umption. Equally, the locus YY in ሺ߰, ݍሻ space is 
negatively-sloped, since a higher leve l of indebtedness relative to the domestic stock of capital 
raises the domestic real interest rate ݎ൫ ෨߰൯, which, under arbitrage, requires a lower Tobin’s ݍ. 
To evaluate the intertemporal implications of fiscal, m onetary po licy and the  in terest 
premium, we derive the expre ssion describing the dynam ics of domestic real m oney balances 
scaled by th e dom estic capital stock. Com bining ሺ3cሻ with ሺ4bሻ and substituting for ሺ3aሻ, we  
obtain 
ሶ݉
݉ ൌ ߪ ൅ ݎ ቀ
ݖ
݇ቁ െ
ߛܿ
݉ .																																																									ሺ10aሻ 
Letting ߤ ≡ ݉/݇ represent the real m oney-capital ratio, so that ߤሶ/ߤ ൌ ሶ݉ /݉ െ ሶ݇ /݇, and using 
ሺ3bሻ and ሺ10aሻ, as well as th e def initions ߯ ≡ ܿ/݇  and ߰ ≡ ݖ/݇ , we obt ain the differential 
equation for ߤ: 
ߤሶ ൌ ൤ߪ ൅ ݎሺ߰ሻ െ ݍ െ 1݄ ൨ ߤ െ ߛ ∙ ߯.																																															ሺ10bሻ 
Linearizing ሺ10bሻ about the steady-state equilib rium, substituting for the solu tions ሺ9aሻ െ ሺ9bሻ, 
and integrating the resulting expression subject to the tranversality condition yield the saddlepath 
solution for ߤ:  
ߤ ൌ ߛ ∙ ෤߯ߪ ൅ ߜ ൅
Ω ∙ ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯݁కభ௧
ߪ ൅ ߜ െ ߦଵ ,																																													ሺ10cሻ 
where 
ߤ෤ ൌ ߛ ∙ ෤߯ߪ ൅ ߜ ,																																																																			ሺ10dሻ 
                                                     
8 The derivation of ሺ9aሻ െ ሺ9bሻ is shown in the Appendix. 
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is the steady-state value of real money-domestic ratio and 
Ω ≡ ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ൬ߤ෤ െ ߛ ෤߯ߦଵ ൰ ൤1 ൅
ݍ෤
ሺߜ െ ߦଵሻ൨ ൐ 0. 
We observe that the latter implies that the long-run ratio of real money to consumption, ቀ௠/௞෫௖/௞෪ ቁ, is 
ߛ/ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻ. 
Finally, given our logarithm ic pref erences parameterization, using equations (10a-10d) 
and integrating, we obtain a measure of discounted welfare scaled by the capital stock given by: 
ܹ ൌ 1ߜ ሺlog ෤߯ ൅ ߛ log ߤ෤ሻ ൅ ൬
1
ߜ െ ߦଵ൰ ሺݓଵ ൅ ߛݓଶሻ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯,																							ሺ11ሻ 
where ݓଵ ≡ ି௩
ᇲ൫ట෩൯
కభ ቂ1 ൅
௤෤/௛
ఋିకభቃ ൐ 0;	ݓଶ ≡ ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ቀ1 െ ఊఞ෥కభఓ෥ቁ ቂ1 ൅
௤෤/௛
ఋିకభቃ ൐ 0.																																									 
 
3. Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint 
We begin by substitu ting ܩሺݐሻ െ ܶሺݐሻ ൌ ሾ݃̅ െ തܶሺݐሻሿߙ݇ሺݐሻ  and ሶ݉ ൌ ሺߪ െ ݌∗ െ ݁ሻ݉  into the 
government budget identity, yielding: 
ሶܽ ൌ ሾ݃̅ െ തܶሺݐሻሿߙ݇ ൅ ݎ ቀݖ݇ቁ ܽ െ ߬ߙ݇ െ ߪ݉.																																						ሺ12aሻ 
Defining real governm ent debt in te rms of the dom estic capital stock ߱ ≡ ܽ/݇ (so that ሶ߱ /߱ ൌ
ሶܽ/ܽ െ ሶ݇ /݇) and using def initions ߰ ≡ ݖ/݇ and ߤ ≡ ݉/݇, we calculate the dif ferential equation 
for ߱: 
ሶ߱ ൌ ሾ݃̅ െ തܶሺݐሻሿߙ ൅ ൤ݎሺ߰ሻ െ ݍ െ 1݄ ൨߱ െ ߬ߙ െ ߪ ∙ ߤ.																														ሺ12bሻ 
Linearizing ሺ12bሻ, we obtain: 
ሶ߱ ൌ ߜ߱ ൅ ሾ݃̅ െ തܶሺݐሻ െ ߬ሿߙ െ ߪ ∙ ߤ ൅ ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ෥߱ ∙ ൫߰ െ ෨߰൯ െ ෥݄߱ ∙ ሺݍ െ ݍ෤ሻ.												ሺ12cሻ 
Substitution for the saddlepath solutions for ߤ, ߰, and ݍ, we find: 
ሶ߱ ൌ ߜ߱ ൅ ሾ݃̅ െ തܶሺݐሻ െ ߬ሿߙ െ ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯ߪ ൅ ߜ െ Φ ∙ ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯݁
కభ௧,																										ሺ12dሻ 
where 
Φ ≡ σΩσ ൅ δ െ ߦଵ ൅ ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ෥߱ ൤1 ൅ ݍ෤ߜ െ ߦଵ൨ 
ൌ െݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯
ߜ ൤1 ൅
ݍ෤
ߜ െ ߦଵ൨ ൤ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙ ൅
ߜ െ ߦଵ
ߦଵ ∙ ߪߤ෤൨ ൐ 0 
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and represents a scale factor for the transitional dynamics effect. Imposing that the ratio of public 
debt in te rms of  the capita l stock ev olves from a given initial level, ߱ሺ0ሻ ≡ ߱଴, integration of  
ሺ12dሻ results in the following general solution for ߱: 
߱ ൌ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ ൅
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ ൅
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯݁కభ௧ െ ߙ݁ఋ௧ න തܶሺݏሻ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
௧
଴
							 
																																	൅ ቈ߱ሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ െ
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯቉ ݁ఋ௧.																							ሺ12eሻ 
Imposing the transversality  condition lim௧→ஶ ߣ߱݁ݔ݌ െ ቂߜݐ െ ׬ ߶ሺݏሻ݀ݏ௧଴ ቃ ൌ 0  on the general 
solution ሺ12eሻ, we solve for the intertemporal government budget constraint: 
ߙන തܶሺݏሻ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
ஶ
଴
ൌ ߱ሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ െ
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯.											ሺ13aሻ 
Equally, this long-run restriction can be expresse d direc tly in term s of the path of lum p-sum 
taxes, ܶሺݐሻ, scaled by the domestic capital stock: 
න ሾܶሺݏሻ/݇ሺݏሻሿ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
ஶ
଴
ൌ ߱ሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ െ
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯.							ሺ13bሻ 
Back substituting the intertem poral budget c onstraint into the general solution for ߱, we obtain 
the saddlepath relationship for the ratio of the st ock of public debt in term s of t he dom estic 
capital stock: 
߱ ൌ െሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ ൅
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ ൅
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯݁కభ௧ ൅ ߙන തܶሺݏሻ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
ஶ
௧
.							ሺ14aሻ 
The latter can, of course, be written directly in terms of the path of lump-sum taxes scaled by the 
capital stock: 
߱ ൌ െሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ ൅
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ ൅
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯݁కభ௧ ൅ න ሾܶሺݏሻ/݇ሺݏሻሿ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
ஶ
௧
,					ሺ14bሻ 
where along the balanced growth path: 
෥߱ ൌ െ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ ൅
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ ൌ െ
ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙ
ߜ ൅
ߪ ∙ ߤ෤
ߜ ,																													ሺ14cሻ 
represents the long-run stock of government debt scaled by capital stock.  
Clearly, ෥߱  depends directly on the prim ary fiscal deficit ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻ and on the revenues 
from money creation, represented by ߪ ∙ ߤ෤, where we substitute for ሺ10dሻ to obtain the second 
equality of ሺ14cሻ. In view of ሺ14cሻ, we can express the long-run re striction on the path of the 
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lump-sum taxes in terms of the long-run adjustment of government and national debt in terms of 
the domestic capital stock: 
න ሾܶሺݏሻ/݇ሺݏሻሿ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
ஶ
଴
ൌ ሾ߱ሺ0ሻ െ ෥߱ሿ െ Φߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯.																								ሺ13b′ሻ 
For the remainder of the paper, we define ሺ13b′ሻ the present discounted value of taxes required 
to maintain intermporal solvency of the public sector budget as: 
ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ≡ න ሾܶሺݏሻ/݇ሺݏሻሿ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
ஶ
଴
ൌ ߱ሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ െ
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯,																																			ሺ15ሻ 
where ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ represents the m easure of sus tainable long-run fiscal balance discussed in Bruce 
and Turnov sky (1999),  Bianconi (1999), and  Bian coni an d Fisher (2 005). In  ad dition to  th e 
initial stock of public debt (scaled by the capital stock) ߱ሺ0ሻ, observe that the m easure ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ 
of the long-run tax liability stated in ሺ15ሻ depends not only on the prim ary deficit ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻ net of 
inflation tax revenue (represented by the term  
ఙఊ∙ఞ෥
ሺఙାఋሻఋ ൌ
ఙ∙ఓ෥
ఋ ), but also—in contrast to Bianconi 
and Fisher (2005)—on the long-run accum ulation of na tional debt in terms of the capital stock  
൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯, as well as on the speed of stable adjustment ߦଵ ൏ 0. The latter is a consequence of the 
fact that the economy borrows (and lends) subject to the upward-sloping interest rate relationship 
described in ሺ1cሻ.9 
 
4. Steady State, Long-Run Effects and Impact Effects 
Letting ሶ߯ ൌ ሶ߰ ൌ ݍሶ ൌ 0, the long-run equilibrium of the small open economy corresponds to: 
ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ߜ ൌ ሺ݅∗ െ ݌∗ሻ ൅ ݒ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ߜ ൌ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ൌ ߶෨,																																ሺ16aሻ 
෤߯ ൅ ݍ෤
ଶ െ 1
2݄ െ
ሺݍ෤ െ 1ሻ ෨߰
݄ ൅ ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ ෨߰ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݃̅ሻߙ,																																		ሺ16bሻ 
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߙ
ݍ෤ ൅
ሺݍ෤ െ 1ሻଶ
2݄ݍ෤ ൌ ݎ൫ ෨߰൯,																																																	ሺ16cሻ 
                                                     
9 In Bianconi and Fisher(2005), the formula for the long term tax liability is: ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ 
≡ ׬ ሾܶሺݏሻ/݇ሺݏሻ	ሿ݁ିሺ௚ାఋሻ௦݀ݏ ൌ െ ሺ௚തିఛሻఈௗାఋ ൅
ఙఊ∙ఞ෥
ሺఙାఋሻఋ
∞
଴  where ݃  is the growth of consumption and ݀  is the 
difference between the growth of consumption and the capital stock. 
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where ݔ ൌ ݔ෤  denotes a stead y-state variable. The th ree equations determ ine the values of 
൛ݍ෤, ෨߰, ෤߯ൟ as a function of the parameters of the model, independently of the initial conditions. 
Equation ሺ16aሻ  is the long-run consum ption-Euler relationship and in dicates tha t the 
steady-state balanced growth ߶෨ equals the real interest rate ne t of the rate of physical capital. 
Long-run market clearing is given in equation ሺ16bሻ, while ሺ16cሻ is the steady-state version of 
the arbitrage equation ሺ16cሻ . As in Turnovsky (1997a), th e endogenous adjustm ent of the 
national real interest rate ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ insures that in long-run equilibrium the ratios of consumption and 
national debt to dom estic capital reach their steady-state values and, thus, that the econom y 
ultimately attains a common growth rate ߶෨. Observe, moreover, that the steady-state equilibrium 
ሺ16aሻ െ ሺ16cሻ is non-linear. It is straightforward to  establish the conditions under which the  
economy’s steady-state balanced growth rate is unique and positive.10 
The m odel econom ic policy param eters are ሼ݃̅, ߬, ߪ; ߱ሺ0ሻሽ while the  m odel pa rameters 
are ሼ݄, ߜ, ߙ, ߛ, ݎሺ݅∗, ݌∗, ݒሻሽ.11 In Table 1a we present som e comparative statics of the fiscal an d 
monetary policy variables and th e param eter of the real interest function (including the risk 
premium relationship) on the balanced growth equilibrium. Table 1b presents th e corresponding 
impact effects. All effects are evaluated at the initial balanced growth equilibrium. We first note 
that the order of the effects (from left to right in Table 1a) represents th e order of im pact on the 
overall economy. A shift in the capital tax rate affects all endogenous va riables, followed by the 
real interest function, which, how ever, has no effect on growth ߶෨ . Both of those exogenous 
factors do impact upon the long run national debt per unit of capital, ෨߰ , and thus lead to 
transitional dynamics towards the stable adjustm ent path to the long run balanced growth path. 
This is followed by governm ent spending which—wh ile it crowds-out pr ivate consumption and 
real money balances—has no effect on growth. Finally, increasing the rate of money growth only 
affects money demand. 
In this m odel, government spending and monetary policy do not im pact upon the long-
run national debt per unit of capital, ෨߰, and thus there are no tran sitional dynamics towards the 
                                                     
10  See Turnovsky (1997a)—who uses a more general specification of preferences and productive 
government expenditure—for details. For a general discussion of these issues, see Turnovsky (1997b), 
chapter 5. 
 
11 The initial stock of public debt is included as a policy parameter for the potential case of a change in 
government policy parameters financed by a swap with initial public debt; see e.g. Novales and Ruiz 
(2002).  
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stable adjustment path t o the long run balanced growth path in those cas es. The capital tax rate 
has a negative effect on long run growth and on the m arginal cost of capital. It also has a 
negative effect on the long run national debt and shifts res ources to consum ption and the 
accumulation of real money balances through a lo wer domestic price levels. The effect of the  
capital tax rate on the long run stock of government debt is ambiguous, because while there is the 
direct, negative, effect on long term growth that raises the stock of government debt, there is also 
negative indirect effect through additional consum ption and money balances (the inflation tax 
channel). T he real interest function does not a ffect growth and the long-run m arginal cost of 
capital, but it discourages foreign borrowing thus decreases the long-ru n stock of foreign debt. 
This shift increases long run consum ption a nd m oney balances and raises the long run 
government debt though  the additio nal real intere st cost of debt. Gove rnment spending reduces  
long term money balances through higher price levels thus reduc ing long term government debt; 
but higher money growth has the opposite effect on long term government debt because there is 
no direct long term consumption effect in this case. 
The last row of Table 1a pr esents the effects on discounted  welfare. A change in the  
capital tax rate has tw o opposing effects on welf are. The positive effect of the tax rate on 
consumption and m oney balances raises welfar e, while the negative effect on f oreign debt, 
through the transitional dynam ics, lowers welf are. Similarly for a change in the interest rate 
function. A change in governm ent spending or in the rate of growth of  money lowers welfare 
unambiguously through the consumption and money balances channel. 
In Table 1b we note that the impact effect of a change in the ca pital tax ra te is  
unambiguously negative on the m arginal cost of capital, but a mbiguous for initial co nsumption 
and m oney balanc es. The reason  is that the re is a po sitive ef fect f rom higher long  te rm 
consumption but a negative effect from  lower long term foreign debt. An increase in the real 
interest function also decrease s the initial m arginal cost of capital but has sim ilar a mbiguous 
effects in initial consum ption and money bala nces. A change in governm ent spending does not  
affect the initial m arginal cost  of capital, and it crowds out initial p rivate consu mption and  
reduces in itial m oney balance s thus  increas ing the initia l d omestic pr ice level. Hig her m oney 
growth reduces initial money balances as well. F rom Tables 1a and 1b, it is clear that changes in 
government spending and m oney growth do not gi ve rise to transitional dynam ics, the economy 
jumps from one balanced growth path to another directly.  
14 
 
 
5. Budget Policies and Analysis 
In this section, we describe the implications of a change in the government policy parameters and 
the real interest function on the long-term tax liability. 
There are s everal im portant econo mic questio ns tha t our fram ework can add ress. In  
Bianconi and Fisher (2005), we focused on effect s of changes in fiscal and m onetary policy on 
the balanced growth path, the potential for dynamic scoring effects on the intertemporal budget 
constraint and the use of fiscal and monetary policy to guarantee long run fiscal solvency. The  
novelty in this paper is that th e interest prem ium on debt has e ffects on the growth equilibrium 
and transitional dynamics. Consequently, it adds an  important linkage between fiscal policy and  
the current account, thus shedding light, am ong ot her things, on the twin deficits hypothesis 
discussed, for example, by Feldstein (1987), Ch inn (2005), and Bartolini and Lahiri (2006). The 
key rela tionship tha t illustra tes th is issue is eq uation ሺ15ሻ which we rewrite in term s of  the  
inflation tax: 
ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ≡ න ሾܶሺݏሻ/݇ሺݏሻ	ሿ݁ିఋ௦݀ݏ
ஶ
଴
ൌ ߱ሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ െ
ߪ
ߜ ∙ ߤ෤ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯.	 
Rewriting (15) as: 
߱ሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ݃̅ െ ߬ሻߙߜ ൌ ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൅
ߪ ∙ ߤ෤
ߜ ൅
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙ ൫
෨߰ െ ߰଴൯,																						ሺ17ሻ 
we observe that, holding other factors constant, this model is Ricardian since public debt and 
lump-sum tax liabilities  are p erfectly corr elated, and the prim ary fiscal deficit, ݃̅ െ ߬, (net of 
inflation tax  revenues) and foreign  debt accu mulation, ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯, tend to m ove in the sa me 
direction. 
First, we ex amine the effects of a change in  government policy para meters and th e real 
interest function on th e long term tax liability, ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ , all evaluated at a given initial 
equilibrium. A change in the capital income tax ߬ is obtained by evaluating ሺ15ሻ as follows: 
߲ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ
߲߬ ൌ െ
ߙ
ߜ െ
ߪߛ
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ ∙
߲ ෤߯
߲߬ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙
߲ ෨߰
߲߬ 																														ሺ18aሻ 
ൌ െߙߜ െ
ߪ
ߜ ∙
߲ߤ෤
߲߬ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙
߲ ෨߰
߲߬ ≷ 0. 
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There are three d istinct effect s on the long-run  tax  liability ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ. The f irst is the  nega tive 
effect on the prim ary deficit, െఈఋ , which decreases the long-run tax liability. The next ter m, 
െ ఙఊሺఙାఋሻఋ ∙
డఞ෥
డఛ ൌ െ
ఙ
ఋ ∙
డఓ෥
డఛ  captures the fact that an increase in the tax, because it discourages capital 
accumulation, increases the long-run  consumption-capital ratio ෤߯, which, because it also results 
in an  inc rease in  the  re al m oney capita l ratio ߤ෤, increases inflation ta x revenues and reduces 
ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ. The last term െ ஍ఋିకభ ∙
డట෩
డఛ  refers to the ef fect on national indebtedness and is part of the 
transitional dynamic adjustment induced by the tax change, but is of the opposite sign as the first 
two effects. An increas e in the capital tax  lowers the growth  rate, which  lowers ෨߰ according to 
the s teady s tate consumption Euler relationsh ip ( 16a). Th is will increas e the long run liab ility 
because lo wer growth  lowers  cap ital tax rev enues. This  is  the sou rce of the possibility of 
dynamic scoring in this paper. It is clear, then, th e first two channels lead to a decrease in future  
tax liabilities; but the transitional dynamics channel increases the future tax liability.12 
A change in the share of governm ent spending ݃̅ , evaluating ሺ15ሻ  at the initia l 
equilibrium: 
߲ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ
߲݃̅ ൌ
ߙ
ߜ ൤1 ൅
ߪߜ
ߪ ൅ ߜ൨ ≷ 0.																																																	ሺ18bሻ 
In this case there are two direct ef fects and no transitional dyna mics. The first is the positive 
effect on the prim ary deficit, 
ఈ
ఋ, which increases the long-run tax liability. The next term , 
ఙఋ
ఙାఋ 
captures the fact that an incr ease in the governm ent spending crowds out private consum ption 
and reduces money balances thus increasing ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ. Both channels lead to an increase in future 
tax liabilities.13 
Similarly, a change in the rate of growth of money, ߪ, yields: 
߲ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ
߲ߪ ൌ
ߛ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻଶ ൏ 0.																																																					ሺ18cሻ 
                                                     
12 This result can be related to the earlier findings of Bianconi and Fisher (2005). See their Proposition 1, p. 
12 that describes the conditions for dynamic scoring to take place in their framework in which the 
economy can borrow and lend at the fixed world interest rate. 
 
13 Government spending does not provide any external effects in private utility of production in this 
model, hence just crowds out private consumption and raises the price level with the decline in money 
balances.  
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There are no transitional dynam ics in this case as well and only the inflation tax effect. An 
increase in the growth of m oney reduces m oney balances (increases the price level), but at the 
initial equilibrium it increases inflation tax revenues and reduces ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ. 
Next, we consider a balanced-budget change in the capital tax, i.e., ݀߬ ൌ ݀݃̅. We find: 
߲ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ
߲߬ |ௗఛୀௗ௚ത ൌ െ
ߪ
ߜ ∙
߲ߤ෤
߲߬|ௗఛୀௗ௚ത െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙
߲ ෨߰
߲߬ |ௗఛୀௗ௚ത 																			ሺ19aሻ 
ൌ ߙݎᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ሺݍ෤ ൅ ߜ݄ሻ ቊ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ െ
ߛߪൣ1 െ ݄ݎᇱ൫ ෨߰൯൧
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻ ቋ ≷ 0. 
Clearly, since the prim ary deficit is unaffected by the balanced budget tax cut, im plications for 
long-run tax liabilities depend solely on th e responses of ߤ෤ and ෨߰. It is straightforward to show 
that the change in the cons umption-capital ratio is ambiguous, since an (de)increase in 
government expenditure crowds-in(out) consumption. Specifically, the shift in ෤߯ is given by: 
߲ߤ෤
߲߬|ௗఛୀௗ௚ത ൌ െ
ߛߙߜൣ1 െ ݄ݎᇱ൫ ෨߰൯൧
ݎᇱሺ߰ሻ෪ሺݍ෤ ൅ ߜ݄ሻሺߪ ൅ ߜሻ ≷ 0.																																																ሺ19bሻ 
If the consumption-capital ratio rises(declines) on net, then s o does the r eal money-capital ratio, 
which (de)increases inflation tax revenues and raises the possibility of dyna mic scoring in 
response to a balanced-budget tax cu t. In contrast, the response of national indebtedness is the 
same whether or not ݃̅ falls along with ߬: 
߲ ෨߰
߲߬ ൌ
߲ ෨߰
߲߬ |ௗఛୀௗ௚ത ൌ െ
ߙ
ݒᇱሺݍ෤ ൅ ߜ݄ሻ ൏ 0.																																										ሺ19cሻ 
Thus, as in ( 18a), the rise(decline) in ෨߰ contributes to the rise(declin e) in long-run tax liab ilities 
ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ. 
 In summary, we can state the conditions for dynamic scoring under a capital incom e tax 
rate change. 
Proposition 1: A cut in the capital income tax rate decreases long term government liability if 
ߙ
ߜ ൅
ߪ
ߜ ∙
߲ߤ෤
߲߬ ൏ െ
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ ∙
߲ ෨߰
߲߬ ; 
i.e. the overall weighted effect on foreign borrowi ng is larger than the direct effect plus the 
inflation tax effect. 
This result emerges directly from equation (18a). 
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Proposition 2: A necessary condition for a cut in the cap ital income tax rate balanced with a cut  
in the fraction of government spending to decrease the long term government liability is 
஍
ఋିకభ ൐
ఊఙൣଵି௛௥ᇲ൫ట෩൯൧
ሺఙାఋሻ ; 
and a sufficient condition is that  
1 െ ݄ݎᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ൏ 0						 ⟺ 						 ݎᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ൐ 1݄. 
This finding is a direct consequence of (19a). No te that the sufficient condition implies that the 
slope of the prem ium function has to be greater than the in verse of the slope of the investm ent 
adjustment cost param eter. As long as the slope of the prem ium function is high enough to 
discourage a relatively high level of forei gn borrowing, the likelihood of dyna mic scoring is 
increased. 
We next consider the implications of an ex ternal shock. A shif t in the real in terest 
function ݎ, due, for example, to a rise in the world real interest rate, impacts on the long-term  
liability according to: 
߲ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ
߲ݎ ൌ
1
ݒᇱ ൤െ
ߪߛ ∙ ෤߯
ሺߪ ൅ ߜሻߜ ൅
Φ
ߜ െ ߦଵ൨ ≷ 0.																																											ሺ20ሻ 
The first effect, 
ିଵ
௩ᇲ ∙
ఙఊ
ఙାఋ  refers to the effe ct on long-run consumption and money balances. 
Because a higher real factor in terest does not affect the m arginal cost of capital an d growth, it 
must reduce the long run national indebtedness. This allows higher long run consumption and 
money balances to  increase, which  reduces th e long-term tax liability  through the inflation tax  
channel. However, the transitional dynam ics effect of the lower long ru n national indebtedness, 
ଵ
௩ᇲ ∙
஍
ఋିకభ raises long term tax liability through the higher interest cost and lower growth during the 
transition. Those effects are in opposite direction and the net effect on long term liability is, thus, 
ambiguous. Both effects are scaled by 
ଵ
௩ᇲ  which is th e ( inverse of ) the slope of  th e inte rest 
premium, i.e. the chang e in th e premium given a change in  national indebtedness. The steep er 
the slope of the interest prem ium function, the sm aller the overall net effect of the r eal interest 
rate on the long-term  tax liability  because, all else constant,  the steeper slope im plies a sm aller 
level effect on the great ratios of the economy. Overall, the effect s of the external shock operate 
along the transitional p ath that reflects the decline in national indebtedness. This is because the 
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fall in  indeb tedness leads to a  reduction in th e premium that cau ses the domestic interes t rate 
return to its original long-term level.14 
We now turn to the issue of the long run sustainability of budget policies. Bruce and 
Turnovsky (1999), Bianconi (1999), and Fisher and Bianconi (2005) define a “stricter" m easure 
of sustainability of th e intertem poral budget constraint as th e choice of fiscal and m onetary 
policies that guarantee ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0. In other words, fiscal and monetary polic ies are set so  no 
future tax liabilities are needed to  balance the intertem poral budget.15 In the fra mework of this 
paper, ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0 can be guaranteed by the choice of one  (or m ore) of the governm ent policy 
parameters ሼ݃̅, ߬, ߪ; ߱ሺ0ሻሽ under the restriction that ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0. 
In the nex t section we use num erical simulations and sensitivity analysis to gain further 
insights into the effects of government policy on the long term tax liability under the interest risk 
premium function, including a welfare ranking of the alternative policies. 
 
6. Numerical Simulations 
We provide som e numerical eval uations to illustr ate so me of  the m ain results, with th e 
benchmark set of parameter values used in the simulations for the balanced growth path given by: 
݄ ൌ 1,					ߜ ൌ 0.04,				ߙ ൌ 0.1,				߬ ൌ 0.31,				݃̅ ൌ 0.11,				ߛ ൌ 0.20,				ߪ ൌ 0.04,											ሺ21ܽሻ 
݇଴ ൌ 10 (so that ߙ݇଴ ൌ 1),    ܾ଴ ൌ 0.50,					݅∗ ൌ 0.10,				݌∗ ൌ 0.04,				ߙ଴ ൌ 0.55,			ݖ଴ ൌ 0.05, 
where the implied value of Tobin’s ݍ is 1.0275 > 1 so that the equilibrium is characterized by on-
going growth, e.g. 2.75%. We parameterize the interest premium by the function 
ݒ൫ ෨߰൯ ൌ ݏଵ exp൫ݏଶ ൅ ݏଷ ෨߰൯,						ݏଵ, ݏଶ, ݏଷ ൐ 0,																																					ሺ21bሻ 
and use param eters ݏଵ ൌ 0.00002, ݏଶ ൌ 5.75, and ݏଷ ൌ 1.75. Figure 2 illus trates the convex  
relationship between the level of the national indebtedness in terms of the domestic capital stock 
෨߰, and the  interest premium. We also show the se nsitivity of the interes t rate function where ݏଷ 
increases to 2.75. The initial equilibrium  is one where the tax rate is large relative to the 
government share of output. This initial equili brium implies that the initial tax liability, ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ 
                                                     
14 For example, a rise in the world interest rate ݎ∗, where  ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ ൌ ݎ∗ ൅ ݒ൫ ෨߰൯ yields 
డ௏ሺ்/௞ሻ
డ௥∗ ൌ െ
ఙ
ఋ ∙
డఓ෥
డ௥∗ െ
Φ
ఋିకభ ∙
డట෩
డ௥∗ ൌ െ
ଵ
௥′൫ట෩൯ ቂ
ఙఊ
ఙାఋ െ
Φ
ఋିకభቃ ≷ 0.                                    
15 See also Agell and Persson (2001) and Fredriksson (2007). Ostry et al (2010) introduce an alternative 
concept of ‘fiscal space’ in reference to the difference between the stock of debt limit (requiring 
intertemporal balance) and the stock of current debt. 
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is 0.025, or 2.5% of output; the real interest rate  from the interest rate function is 6.75%; the 
national debt of the nation is a bout 10% of output (the country is  a net debtor to the ROW ); and 
the half life to the balanced growth path is about 6.67 periods. 
First, we present sim ulations of policy change s evaluated at the initial g rowth path; and 
run sensitivity analysis of those r esults a nd welfare rankings. Sec ond, we obtain num erical 
evaluations of policies th at guarantee intertemporal sustainability, or  ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0. In this  latter 
case, we us e a shoo ting algorithm .16 We evaluate the p arameter that so lves ሺ15ሻ and then re-
evaluate the dyna mic and balanced growth pa ths under the new param eter value. W e, thus, 
obtain a new value of ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ and a new value f or the parameter that solves ሺ15ሻ for ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ
0. This process iterates until convergence is obt ained. We run sensitivity  analysis and welfare 
rankings of those policies as well. 
Table 2 presents com parative statics eff ects of governm ent policy changes on the long 
term liability of  the go vernment and welf are evaluated at the initia l equilibrium. The f irst two 
columns refer to the b ase parameter set while  the last two colum ns refer to the cas e where the 
interest premium function is steeper, i.e., ݏଷ increases to 2.75. 
First, an increase in the capital income tax under the base parameter set increases the long 
term tax liability and increases welfare by a small magnitude. The first result indicates that at the 
base par ameter s et, the change in  c apital in come taxes has Laffer style e ffects. However, this 
result is not robust to a st eeper prem ium function. At a hi gher prem ium slope, the dynam ic 
scoring effect disappears and the long term  liabili ty falls by alm ost 10 percentage points. The 
second result shows that when evaluated at the initial equilibrium, higher capital taxe s lead to 
higher consumption (and money balances) thus increasing welfare in both cases.  
The second row is an increas e in the governm ent share of GDP. The effect on the tax 
liability is v ery large relative  to the capital inco me tax rate and welfare declines because of th e 
crowding out effect on private consum ption. At the higher slope of the interest rate function, 
borrowing abroad is more costly, this mitigates the increase in liability and loss in welfare. 
The case of  an inc rease in the  rate of growth of money decr eases the f uture tax liability  
and welfare though the impact on lowe r real money balances (inflation tax effect). Those effects 
are robust across the interest premium, but again a steeper premium function mitigates the effect 
on the long term tax liability because it discourages borrowing abroad. The case of a higher real 
                                                     
16 See e.g. Judd (1998). 
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interest ra te in Tab le 2  refers to e ither an  inc rease in  the  foreign interest rate  or  a  decrease in 
foreign inflation; in this case there is no cha nge in the slope of the prem ium function, Figure 3 
illustrates the interest prem ium function in  this cas e. The long term  liability increas es 
dramatically and welfare also in creases in the base set.  The a dditional effect of changing the 
slope of  the  prem ium function  m itigates the  in crease in  b oth th e lon g te rm liability  and  the  
welfare because of the associated lower long run national indebtedness. 
The next row shows the  effect of increase in the governm ent share of GDP financed by 
higher capital taxes. This has the largest im pact in the long term  liability a mong all the policies 
considered and a m oderate negative im pact on welfare. The steeper interest prem ium function 
makes this effect on the long term  liability much smaller because the dynam ic scoring effect of 
the capital tax rate disappears. The effect on welfare is negative and very similar in both cases. 
Overall, the  short run  r esults of  Ta ble 2  s how that while  u nder the c apital in come tax  
dynamic scoring is possible, the effect is sensit ive to the slope of the premium function and the  
form of fina nce. The potential dynam ic scoring ga ins, in terms of the lo ng term liability, would 
occur at a flat in terest premium function and high levels of ini tial tax rates combined with low  
levels of governm ent spending. However, even under high tax/low spending levels, a steeper  
interest premium function can reverse the dynamic scoring result. 
Table 3 presents results referri ng to policies that satisfy the long term constraint that tax 
liabilities are zero, or ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0. When the policy chang e leads to transitional d ynamics, in 
order to obtain num erical evaluations of policies that guarantee intertempor al sustainability, or 
ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0, we need to evaluate th e parameter that solves ሺ15ሻ for ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0. This process 
iterates until convergence is obtained. When policy change does not lead to transitional dynamics, 
the change occurs instantaneously. 
The first row of Table 3 shows the case for the capital inco me tax rate as a single p olicy 
instrument. At the base param eter set, the capital incom e tax rate should be reduced by 
approximately 0.031 percentage points, with co nvergence achieved in 4 iterations and 10E-6 
accuracy. This is obtained through the dynamic scoring effect under high tax/low spending levels 
initially, and a welfare loss of about 0.33% occu rs. However, the converg ence of the capital 
income tax instrument is not robust. At the steepe r interest rate function, the capital incom e tax 
alone cannot achieve long term budget balance since there is no convergence. Figure 4 illustrates 
the problem of capital tax finance of  the long-term liability f or the steeper interest rate function. 
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The vertical axis is the long term  liability, the lower axis is the tax rate and the upper axis is the 
stable root that determines the speed of adjustment to the long term growth path. It is clear that at 
alternative levels of the tax ra te, the long term  liability does not get to the lower zero bound. At  
low tax rates, the roo t declines and the long term  liability also declines,  but close to the 30% tax 
rate, this process reverses and the long term liability and the stable root increase.17 
The next row of Table 3 shows the case in which government spending adjusts to balance 
the intertemporal budget. This policy does not give  rise to transitional dynam ics. Moreover, an 
instantaneous decrease of 0.02 percentage points from the initial level of governm ent spending 
takes the economy to the new bala nced growth path such th at ܸሺܶ/݇ሻ ൌ 0. The steeper interest 
premium function requires a slightly smaller decrease in government spending. In both cases, the 
welfare gains are small but robust because of the additional priv ate consumption and real money 
balances.  
Finally, we consider the case where both the tax rate and governm ent spending are used 
to balance the intertemporal budg et. This policy converges in bo th interest prem ium functions. 
The decrease in governm ent spending and taxes is  very sm all under the ba se set and slightly 
larger under the alternative interest prem ium, while the welfare gains are robust for both cases. 
Unlike the s ingle capital income tax instrument case, the co mbined tax-cum-spending mix does 
achieve long term balance with 4 iterations and plausible accuracy. 
In sum , the nonlinearities in the model are enough to m ake the i mplementation of  
intertemporal budget balance difficult under single instrument policy when transitional dynamics 
emerge. In Bianconi and Fisher (2 005), the infinite elasticity of supply of debt relationship doe s 
not generate transitional dyna mics, im plying that  single instrum ent policies easily achieve the 
target of balancing the intertem poral budget balance according to the V(T/k)=0 criterion.  
Transitional dynamics due to an upward sloping suppl y of debt leads to interactions between the 
real activity of the economy and the government budget balance through the speed of adjustment 
to the balanced growth path. This intera ction is very sensitive to the set of initia l conditions and 
the parameter space. We find that while dynam ic scoring can occur under one set of param eter 
values, the capital income tax alone cannot balance the intertemporal budget for a significant part 
of the parameter space. 
                                                     
17 There is convergence if the parameter in the slope of the interest premium function ݏଷ changes by an 
infinitesimal amount, and the result is similar to the base parameter set. However, at a more wide range 
of parameter values convergence is not guaranteed. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzes the role of nominal assets in intertemporal budget policies in a growing open 
economy facing an upward sloping supply of debt. W e show that future public sector liabilities 
are a function not only of the fiscal and m onetary policy tools, but also  of the econom y’s long-
run accum ulation of debt scal ed by the do mestic capital st ock. This change has m ajor 
implications for the governm ent budget intertem poral balance. A cut in cap ital income tax may 
lead to dynam ic scoring through as the novel ch annel of  foreign indebtness. H owever, our 
simulations show that using capital incom e taxes alone to balance the intertem poral government 
budget constraint, m ay not be fe asible for a large combination of the parameter values. 
Intertemporal balance can, however, be achiev ed with a tax-cum -expenditure policy or 
government expenditure policy changes alone.  
In f uture w ork we pla n to extend  this f ramework to in clude he terogeneity in  the  
distribution of capital and assets in the model, with particular attention to the effects of inequality 
on the intertemporal government budget balance. 
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Appendix 
 
Derivation of the Saddlepath Solutions (9a)-(9b) 
Linearizing ሺ8ሻ about the steady-state equilibrium, we obtain the following Jacobian system: 
ቌ
ሶ߯
ሶ߰
ݍሶ
ቍ ൌ
ۉ
ۈ
ۈ
ۇ
0 ෤߯ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ෤݄߯
1 ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ ൅ ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ෨߰ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄
ݍ෤ െ ෨߰
݄
0 ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ݍ෤ ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ی
ۋ
ۋ
ۊ
ቌ
߯ െ ෤߯
߰ െ ෨߰
ݍ െ ݍ෤
ቍ.																	ሺA. 1ሻ 
The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian Matrix ࡶ are: 
ࢀ࢘ሺࡶሻ ൌ 2 ൤ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ൨ ൅ ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ෨߰ ൌ ߦଵ ൅ ߦଶ ൅ ߦଷ, 
ࡰࢋ࢚ሺࡶሻ ൌ െቊ൤ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ൨ ෤߯ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ൅ ෤߯ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ݍ෤
݄ ቋ ൌ ߦଵߦଶߦଷ, 
where ߦ௜, ݅ ൌ 1, 2, 3, are the eig envalues of ࡶ. Since the condition ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ௤෤ିଵ௛ ൐ 0 is required to 
satisfy the transversality condition ሺ3eሻ, we obtain ࢀ࢘ሺࡶሻ ൐ 0 and ࡰࢋ࢚ሺࡶሻ ൏ 0. The fact that 
ࢀ࢘ሺࡶሻ ൐ 0 rules-out the case th at all th e eigenvalues are n egative. This im plies that the s teady 
state displays saddlepoint dynamics locally, with one negative and two positive eigenvalues, i.e., 
ߦଵ ൏ 0, ߦଶ ൐ 0, and ߦଷ ൐ 0. 
The stable solutions to the consumption-capital ratio, ߯, the national debt-captial, ߰, and 
Tobin’s ݍ are: 
߯ ൌ ෤߯ ൅ ܣଵ݁కభ௧,																																																																ሺA. 1aሻ 
߰ ൌ ෨߰ ൅ ܤଵ݁కభ௧,																																																															ሺA. 1bሻ 
ݍ ൌ ݍ෤ ൅ ܤଵ݁కభ௧,																																																																	ሺA. 1cሻ 
where ܣଵ, ܤଵ, and ܥଵ, are constants to be determined and where ߦଵ ൏ 0 is the stable eigenvalue. 
The constant ܤଵ  is deter mined by imposing the initial co ndition ߰ሺ0ሻ ≡ ߰଴ ൐ 0 , on the 
adjustment of  the natio nal debt to capital r atio. This yield s ܤଵ ൌ െ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯, substituting for 
ሺA. 1aሻ െ ሺA. 1bሻ and ܤଵ ൌ െ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯ into the Jacobian matrix ሺ9ሻ, we obtain: 
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ۉ
ۈۈ
ۈ
ۇ
െߦଵ ෤߯ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ෤݄߯
1 ൤ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ ൅ ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ෨߰ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ൨ െ ߦଵ
ݍ෤ െ ෨߰
݄
0 ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ݍ෤ ൤ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ݍ෤ െ 1݄ ൨ െ ߦଵی
ۋۋ
ۋ
ۊ
ቌ
ܣଵ
െ൫߰଴ െ ෨߰൯
ܥଵ
ቍ
ൌ ൭
0
0
0
൱																																																																																																																											ሺA. 2ሻ 
Evaluating ሺA. 2ሻ, we derive: 
െߦଵܣଵ െ ෤߯ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ∙ ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯ െ െ ෤݄߯ ∙ ܥଵ ൌ 0,																																		ሺA. 3aሻ 
ܣଵ െ ቊቈݎ൫ ෨߰൯ ൅ ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ ෨߰ െ ሺݍ෤ െ 1ሻ݄ ቉ െ ߦଵቋ ∙ ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯ ൅
൫ݍ෤ െ ෨߰൯
݄ ∙ ܥଵ ൌ 0,										ሺA. 3bሻ 
ݒᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ݍ෤൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯ ൅ ቊቈݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ሺݍ෤ െ 1ሻ݄ ቉ െ ߦଵቋ ∙ ܥଵ ൌ 0,																									ሺA. 3cሻ 
equation ሺA. 3cሻ then solves for ܥଵ: 
ܥଵ ൌ ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯ݍ෤ ∙ ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯
൤ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ሺݍ෤ െ 1ሻ݄ ൨ െ ߦଵ
,																																																			ሺA. 4ሻ 
and yields, by substitution in ሺA. 1cሻ  the saddlepath solution ሺ10bሻ  for Tobin’s ݍ , where 
߰ ൌ ෨߰ െ ሺ ෨߰ െ ߰଴ሻ݁కభ௧. To determ ine ܣଵ, we sub stitute for ܥଵ from ሺA. 4ሻ into either ሺA. 3aሻ or 
ሺA. 3bሻ. The convenient version is obtained by substituting into ሺA. 3aሻ and yields the following 
expression for ܣଵ: 
ܣଵ ൌ ෤߯ݒ
ᇱ൫ ෨߰൯
ߦଵ ൦1 ൅
ݍ෤/݄
൤ݎ൫ ෨߰൯ െ ሺݍ෤ െ 1ሻ݄ ൨ െ ߦଵ
൪ 	 ∙ ൫ ෨߰ െ ߰଴൯,																											ሺA. 5ሻ 
which, given  ሺA. 1aሻ, results in the saddlepath solution for ሺ10aሻ for the consum ption-capital 
ratio ߯. 
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Table 1a: Long Run Comparative Statics 
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Table 1b: Initial Impact Effects 
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Table 2: Policy changes from an initial equilibrium  
 Base 
parameter 
set 
 Sen sitivity: s3 
increases to 
2.75 
 
 V(T/K) 
% from 
initial eq. 
W 
% from 
initial eq. 
V(T/K) 
% from initial 
eq. 
W 
% from initial 
eq. 
36.0
;0




(*) 
200.4 0. 020 -9.9 0.015 
16.0
;0


g
g
 
510.4 - 3.280 304.3 -3.200 
04125.0
;0




 
-8.9 - 0.097 -5.4 -0.097 
073.0
;0


r
r
(*) 
665.3 9. 980 276.9 6.180 
16.0
36.0
;0



g
g


(*) 
717.6 - 2.740 299.4 -2.790 
50.0)0(
26.0
;0)0(






(*) 
93.4 - 0.030 169.4 -0.020 
50.0)0(
16.0
;0
)0(.






g
g
 
710.6 - 3.280 423.6 -3.200 
Note: (*) indicates the policy change generates transitional dynamics. 
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Table 3: Policy changes to balance long term liability: V(T/K)=0  
Note: (*) indicates the policy change generates transitional dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Base Parameter Set    Sensitivity: s3 
increases to 2.75 
   
 # of 
iterat. 
Accur. W 
% from initial 
eq. 
 # of 
iterat. 
Accur. W 
% from 
initial eq. 
279.0
;0




(*) 
4 1 0E-6 -0.337  (*) No 
Conv. 
-- --  
090.0
;0


g
g
 
-- --  0.656 
093.0
;0


g
g
 
-- --  0.517 
103.0
303.0
;0



g
g


(*) 
4 1 0E-7 0.264 
090.0
290.0
;0.



g
g


(*) 
4 1 0E-7 0.281 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Dynamics 
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Figure 2: Interest Premium Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Interest Premium Function; r 
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Figure 4: Capital Income Tax under Long Term Balance: V(T/k)=0 
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